COMMENTS
BANKS AND BANKING: AUTHORITY OF STATE BANKING
SUPERINTENDENT TO CHALLENGE BRANCHING
ACTIVITIES OF NATIONAL BANKS
The Comptroller of the Currency may authorize a national bank
to establish a branch when such establishment would be permitted
state banks by the local state statute. Competitor banks can challenge the Comptroller's determination alleging noncompliance
with the state standard. This comment examines the question of
the state's independent ability, proceeding under either state or
federal law, to question a ruling by the Comptroller.
36 (c) of the National Banking Act provides that a national
bank may be authorized by the Comptroller of the Currency to
establish a branch if a state bank would be authorized to do so under
the same circumstances.' However, the statute makes no reference
to judicial review of the decisions of the Comptroller;2 furthermore,
although section 36 (c) incorporates state law,8 it fails to indicate
whether a state banking official may sue to enjoin a national bank
which is acting upon the Comptroller's authority from allegedly
violating the state bank-branching law. 4 Thus the inquiry here will
attempt to determine whether the state may enforce its standards for
branching upon national banks by suit under either state or federal
law. The former alternative raises the issue of the pre-emption of
state law by section 36 (c), while the latter necessitates a discussion
of the state's standing to sue under the National Banking Act.
Prior to the passage of legislation specifically authorizing national
SECT7ON

2 "A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency, establish and operate new branches: (1) Within the limits of the city, town
or village in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are
at the time expressly authorized to State banks by the law of the State in question; and
(2) at any point within the State in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation, are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law of
the State in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and
not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location
imposed by the law of the State on State Banks .. " Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, § 23,
48 Stat. 189 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36 (c) (1964).
See note 13 infra and accompanying text.
See note 1 supra.
'Bell, National Bank Branches-The Authority to Approve and to Challenge, 19
Bus. LAw. 887, 911 (1964).
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bank branching, the Supreme Court in First Nat'l Bank v. Missouri5
ruled that a state could enforce its law prohibiting branch banking
against a national bank. 6 The Court grounded its decision upon
the premise that there was no paramount federal law pertaining to
branching with which state law would conflict. 7 Thereafter, in 1927
Congress enacted the forerunner of section 36 (c), which expressly
permitted national banks to establish branches under certain of the
limitations imposed by state statutes upon state banking institutions.8
The passage of section 36 (c) implemented a congressional design
to maintain competitive equality between the state and federal
banking systems. 9 This policy has been under strain in recent years,
however, as the Comptroller of the Currency has more actively
sought to expand branch banking by national banks, 10 an endeavor
5263

U.S. 640 (1924).

The state attorney general brought a proceeding in the

nature of quo warranto in a state court to determine the authority of a national

bank to establish a branch allegedly in violation of state law. Id. at 655.
6 The Court very carefully limited the state's remedy to enforcement of the state
banking statute: "The State is neither seeking to enforce a law of the United States
nor endeavoring to call the bank to account for an act in excess of its charter powers.
What the State is seeking to do is to vindicate and enforce its own law .... Id. at
660.
7
1d. at 657-59. The relevant federal statutes, REV. STAT. §§5184, 5136, 5190
(1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 22, 24, 81 (1964), did not specifically prohibit any
form of branch banking, but the Court found that federal legislation did "not
contemplate the establishment of branch banks." 263 U.S. at 658. The Court therefore concluded that state law prohibiting branching would be applicable: "Having
determined that the power sought to be exercised by the bank finds no justification
in any law or authority of the United States, the way is open for enforcement of the
state statute." Id. at 660.
8 Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1228 (1927), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)
(1964). See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
9
First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 492 (1966); National
Bank v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537, 540 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
830 (1958); Hoosier State Bank v. Saxon, 248 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Ind: 1965);
Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 F. Supp. 134, 140 (M.D. Ga.), rev'd on other grounds,
349 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1965); Commercial Sec. Bank v. Saxon, 236 F. Supp. 457, 460
(D.D.C. 1964); Suburban Trust Co. v. National Bank, 211 F. Supp. 694, 697 (D.N.J.
1962); Commercial State Bank v. Gidney, 174 F. Supp. 770, 774 (D.D.C. 1959), aff'd per
curiam, 278 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Handler, JurisdictionalAbstention in FederalState Branch Bank Conflicts, 19 RuTGERS L. REv. 445, 448 n.19, 450 n.25 (1965).
10 "We have sought by every lawful means to maximize the competitive capacity of
banks under our jurisdiction, and we shall continue to do so." Former Comptroller
James J. Saxon, quoted in Mr. Saxon's Reply to State Supervisors' Poll, Bankirig, May
1963, pp. 157-58. Saxon maintained that the banking system should be viewed as an
instrument of economic expansion. Since most of the policy changes of banking regulation have occurred during periods of economic crisis, he contended that they are
ill-suited to meet the needs of the time. Saxon, Bank Expansion and Economic Growth:
A New Prospective, 8 ANurmus-r BuLL. 597 (1964). Thus he sought amendment of the
current legislation to free national banks from state branching requirements. Comment, 32 U. CHI. L. Rav. 148 n.3 (1964).
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which has often conflicted with the more conservative policies of state
officials.' This factor, in addition to more intense economic competition among financial institutions, has led to an increase in litigation under the statute.'2
Under the terms of the National Banking Act, the only enforcement procedure specifically provided for violations of the statute is
a suit brought by the Comptroller. 8 However, since 1958 it has
been clear that a competitor bank has standing to challenge a ruling
by the Comptroller as violative of the act.' 4 Whether a state may
sue the Comptroller or a national bank to enjoin branching on the
theory that it violates either state or federal law has been decided by
two federal courts with conflicting results.' 5
11

State bankers and state bank supervisors strongly opposed Saxon's efforts to free
federal branch banking from the restrictions of state law. See the statement by
Robert L. Myers, Jr., President of the National Association of Supervisors of State
Banks, in Bratter, How the NASSB Views.Some Current Issues, Banking, Sept. 1962,

p. 51. The NASSB represents a large combined membership of state bankers and state
banking supervisors. Ibid. According to Myers, "today a primary objective of our
association is to resist and stem the present strong trend toward Federal control of the
entire banking system, both state and national." Id. at 52.
12
Bell, supra note 4, at 887 & n.2, 888, observes that increased litigation dates from
1958, when a state bank first successfully enjoined the Comptroller of the Currency from
granting a certificate to a national bank to establish a'branch. See National Bank v.
Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 83 (1958).
ts REv. STAT. § 5239 (1875), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 98 (1964). This section refers
only to action the Comptroller is to take against directors of national banks who
violate the statute and is silent about remedies available to an aggrieved party against
the Comptroller or a national bank.
",Alleging irreparable injury to its property, the plaintiff bank may sue either the
national bank or the Comptroller. E.g., Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans
& Trust Co., 323 F.2d 290, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1968), rev'd and remanded on other grounds,
879 U.S. 411 (1965); National Bank v. Wayne Oakland Bank, 252 F.2d 537, 544 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 858 U.S. 830 (1958); Commercial Sec. Bank v. Saxon, 286 F. Supp.
457, 458 (D.D.C. 1964); First Natl Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 232 F. Supp. 725, 728
(E.D.N.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 352 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965); Suburban Trust
Co. v. National Bank, 211 F. Supp. 694, 700 (D.N.J. 1962); Commercial State Bank v.
Gidney, 174 F. Supp. 770, 780 (D.D.C. 1959).
I 5 Compare South Dakota v. National Bank, 219 F. Supp. 842 (D.S.D. 1968), with
Jackson v. First Natl Bank, 849 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1965). Several other cases involving
a state suit against the Comptroller or a national bank have not explicitly confronted
the standing issue. In Suburban Trust Co. v. National Bank, supra note 14, at 700
n.1, the court specifically declined to express an opinion on the standing of the state
attorney general and bank commissioner, since they were joined as plaintiffs with
a state bank which had shown irreparable injury. In Texas v. National Bank of
Commerce, 290 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 832 (1961), the state challenged
the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to authorize national banks to establish
branches on military reservations in Texas, and the court rendered a decision on the
merits without raising. the question of standing. When the question of standing arose
later in the same circuit it was urged by counsel that the Texas case was of precedential
significance on the ground that the question had been contested in the opposing briefs
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In South Dakota v. NationalBank,16 the state through its attorney
general sued a national bank to enjoin its operation of branches, alleging alternatively violations of state and federal law. 17 Citing Missouri, the state contended that, since federal law adopted state law
as the standard to be applied in branching, there could be no conflict with federal legislation and that the state was the proper party
"to enforce and vindicate" its own law. 8 The federal district court
rejected this argument on the ground that Missouri was distinguishable because, after that case was decided, Congress had pre-empted
the state legislation by specifically authorizing national banks to
establish branches. 19 In addition, the court ruled that the state could
not enforce the paramount federal law because it had neither statu21
tory authority to do So 20 nor standing to sue as an injured party.
and that the court could not have decided on the merits, as it did, without having first
resolved this threshold issue. Brief for the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae, p. 8, Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, supra. Without specifically accepting this argument, the court
of appeals in Jackson observed that "the authority of the Superintendent to bring an
action [was] ... implicit in our decision" in the Texas case. 349 F.2d at 75.
A state court has denied a state attorney general authority to challenge the establishment of a national bank branch in a quo warranto proceeding on the theory that
if branching is permitted under state law, national banks "need look only to the terms
of the National Bank Act for guidance and approval of their actions." Rushton v.
Michigan Nat'l Bank, 298 Mich. 417, 432, 299 N.W. 128, 134 (1941).
18219 F. Supp. 842 (D.S.D. 1963), aff'd on other grounds, 335 F.2d 444 (8th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 879 U.S. 970 (1965). The question of the state's standing to enjoin
an alleged violation of § 36 (c) had become moot on appeal, since the ground upon
which standing had been claimed, a State Banking Commission rule, had been declared invalid by the South Dakota Supreme Court in Livestock State Bank v. State
Banking Comm'n, 80 S.D. 491, 127 N.W.2d 139 (1964).
'17The state maintained that violation of the state law constituted a violation of
federal law under § 36 (c). 219 F. Supp. at 845.
18
Ibid.
2' "The result of the adoption of § 36 (c) is that there is now paramount federal
law on the subject, and thus the states may no longer adopt and enforce their own
laws restricting or prohibiting branching by national banks." Id. at 846. A state
court has reached the same result. See Attorney General ex rel. State Banking Comm r
v. National Bank, 338 Mich. 610, 614-15, 61 N.W.2d 804, 807 (1953) (state's action dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on same reasoning).
The South Dakota court also noted with apparent approval the defendant bank's
contention that since federal jurisdiction was founded on the federal question statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1964), adjudication of the dispute as a question of state law would
have deprived the court of jurisdiction. 219 F. Supp. at 846. But see note 33 infra.
50 219 F. Supp. at 848; see note 13 supra and accompanying text.
21219 F. Supp. at 847. The state based its argument as to standing upon the
assertion that the national bank branches threatened substantial and irreparable harm
to the state, the public, the state banking system, and the state banks. Id. at 844.
The court acknowledged that a state bank threatened with invasion of its property
rights would have had standing to sue, but found that the state,had failed to show
any such threat to the state itself, to a state bank, or to any individual. Furthermore,
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A contrary result was reached more recently by the Fifth Circuit
in Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank.22 There the state superintendent of
banks sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendant
national bank, 23 which was operating a "drive-in facility," allegedly
in violation of state law24 and thus in noncompliance with the federal

statute. 25 The federal district court in an unreported decision had
dismissed the complaint without reaching the merits, 2 utilizing the
federal pre-emption27 and lack of standing rationale 28 of South
Dakota.29 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holdthe court expressed doubt that a demonstration of injury to an individual would
be sufficient to sustain the state's standing to sue, citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923). 219 F. Supp. at 847 (dictum).
-11349 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1965).
21The suit was originally brought in a state court, but was removed to the federal
district court by the defendant on the theory that that court would have had original
jurisdiction under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1964). Record,
pp. 36-37, 41, Jackson v. First Natl Bank, 349 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1965) [hereinafter cited
as Jackson Record]. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a) (1964).
2' Since the defendant bank already had its principal office and one branch in
Valdosta, the state superintendent of banks contended that the establishment of the
drive-in teller facility was a violation of GA. CODE § 13-203.1 (c) (Supp. 1966), which
limits the branching activity of state banks to one branch in a town the size of Valdosta.
Jackson Record 38-39; 349 F.2d at 73. However, an exception to the Georgia statutory
branching limitations is provided by a state banking regulation which states that a
"Drive-in Teller Facility within the boundary lines of a single contiguous area of
property owned and/or leased and occupied as a banking house by such parent bank
...
whether physically connected to the main banking house or not ... shall not be
considered an additional bank office, but rather as an expansion of the existing
banking house." Ga. Superintendent of Banks Reg. VI (3) (a) (1963), quoted in Jackson
Record 39; see 349 F.2d at 73. In addition, Ga. Superintendent of Banks Reg.
VI (3) (b) (1963) provides that a facility located across a street or alley from the main
banking house, but connected to it by an overhead passage or an underground tunnel,
also will be considered only an expansion. Jackson Record 37-38; see 349 F.2d at 73.
In the instant case the Comptroller did not issue a certificate authorizing the establishment of a branch, as he is empowered to do by Act of Feb. 25, 1927, ch. 191, § 7,
44 Stat. 1228 (1927), 12 U.S.C. § 36 (e) (1964). See Bell, supra note 4, at 907 & n.68.
Rather, he ruled that no such branching certificate was necessary for the defendant's
installation since the alleged branch met the requirements of a drive-in facility,
Jackson Record 36, although it was located 281 feet from the principal bank on property not contiguous with the principal office property and not connected to it within
the requirements of the regulation. Id. at 40-41; 349 F.2d at 73. Thus, the precise
issue being litigated was whether the defendant's facility was a branch under the state
statutory definition or an extension of the principal office under the regulatory exception.
"3 Jackson Record 8, 13. The defendant argued that the operation of the facility
was solely a matter of federal law to be interpreted and enforced by the Comptroller
of the Currency, not by the state banking superintendent. Id. at 31.
26Jackson v. First Natl Bank, Civil No. 647 (M.D. Ga., June 30, 1964); Jackson
Record 35-46; 349 F.2d at 73.
27 Jackson Record 43-44; 349 F.2d at 73.
' 8 Jackson Record 45-46; 349 F.2d at 73.
21See text accompanying notes 16-21 supra.
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ing that the state official could maintain the suit. ° However, the
ambiguous language of the opinion leaves unclear whether the
authority of the state to sue is ultimately founded upon its right to
enforce state law or its competency to seek the enforcement of federal law.3 ' The former rationale raises the spectre of federal preemption of state law, the latter the question whether the state has
standing to assert noncompliance with the federal statute.
1. Pre-emption
Problems of pre-emption immediately arise because of the nature
of federal law as a "largely interstitial product, rarely occupying any
field completely, building normally upon legal relationships established by the states. 3 2 However, since the federal government has
only partially entered the banking realm, the states have been left
with concurrent power to establish and regulate their own banking
systems. 3 3 A further significant feature of the dual system is that
federal law does not purport to regulate every aspect of national
banking; state law governs, for example, in the ordinary. business
transactions of national banks.3 4
It is clear, however, that, if Congress had authorized national
"0"[W]e find that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of,

a proper party plaintiff .
349 F.2d at 75.
3..."
31 See notes 39-42, 67-68 infra and accompanying text.
Furthermore, it is quite
possible to read the Jackson opinion as permitting a state either to bring suit under its
own law or to have standing to commence an action under federal law. See 349 F.2d at
73-74; note 39 infra.
3
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: the Rdle of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLurm. L. Rev. 543, 545

(1954).
"I"Having... discretion not to act at all, Congress a fortiori has discretion to act
only for a limited purpose ....... Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal
Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 526 (1954).
While state governments have general regulatory powers over the banks which are
chartered under state law, the federal banks are within a separate system that Congress
is authorized to establish as an exercise of its enumerated constitutional powers, U.S.
CONsT. art. I, § 8, in combination with the necessary and proper clause, U.S. CONsr.
art. I, § 8 [18]. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 411-12 (1819); The
federal system is independent from state regulation, since the National Banking Act
constitutes "by itself a complete system for the establishment and government of
national banks .....
Cook County Natl Bank v. United States, 107 U.S. 445, 448
(1882).
"National Bank v. Commonweath, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869). The traditional rubric has been that a national bank is subject to state law "unless that law
interferes with the purposes of its creation, or destroys its efficiency, or is in conflict
with some paramount federal law." Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 292 U.S. 559, 566
(1934); see Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896); National Bank v.
Commonwealth, supra at 362.
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banks to branch without reference to state law, the states would have
been prohibited from requiring national banks to comply with their
branching laws, because, in instances of conflict, the supremacy clause
of the Constitutions5 dictates that federal authority will be controlling. 6 However, since, section 36 (c) incorporates state law, it
might be inferred that Congress did not intend to preclude the state
from enforcing its own law,3 7 which, because of the incorporation,
would not logically conflict with the federal law. 8
In the initial part of its opinion the court of appeals in Jackson
appeared to view the problem as one of the enforcement of state law
which had not been pre-empted by federal law.3 9 After construing
-"U.S.

CoNsr. art. VI,

§ 2.

8"See Jennings v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 294 U.S. 216, 226 (1935); Davis v.
Elmira Say. Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896).
37 Otherwise stated, the question is whether an exercise of state power is compatible
with the federal legislation. See note 58 infra and accompanying text. However, the
courts have generally approached problems of pre-emption as an attempt to divine
what Congress intended, despite the fact that in most instances congressmen probably
never anticipated particular problems arising from the interrelationship of state and
federal law and consequently never entertained any such collective "intent." Note, 12
STAN. L. Rav. 208, 209 (1959).
In so doing, the courts have formulated "an often
conflicting and frequently unsatisfactory set of rules under which some answer to
congressional intent can be given." Hunt, State Control of Sedition: The Smith
Act as the Supreme Law of the Land, 41 MINN. L. Rv.287, 292 (1957). Pennsylvania
v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), detailed three of the more frequently mentioned tests
of pre-emption,,namely, whether the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently comprehensive that no room is left in which the states can operate, id. at 502; whether the
federal interest in the field is so dominant that the-state will be excluded, id. at 504;
and whether the exercise of state power would conflict with the administration of the
federal program, id. at 505. However, these "tests" of pre-emption are vague and
conclusory and do not indicate the manner in which particular results are reached.
In fact, the pre-emption cases reflect a bewildering diversity of approaches and
results. See Petro, Labor Relations Law, 32 N.Y.U.L. RYv. 266, 266-80 (1957); Comment, 1966 DuxE L.J. 484 and cases cited therein. See generally Hunt, supra at 290-99;
Note, 12 STAN. L. Ray. 208 (1959).
"8See 349 F.2d at 74. But see notes 58-62 infra and accompanying text.
Cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945): "Congress. . . will not be deemed to have intended to strike down a state statute.., unless
the state law, in terms or in its practical administration, conflicts with the Act of
Congress, or plainly and palpably infringes its policy." (Emphasis added.)
"9"It is conceptually proper to divide the Superintendent's complaint into two
branches, as the district court apparently did, one challenging the new facility as a
violation of state law and the other challenging it as a violation of federal law.
The questions for determination under the first branch would be (1) Does the state law
purport to apply to national banking associations? and (2) If so, is such application
precluded by a pre-emptive federal law? The district court by-passed the first question and answered the second affirmatively. Under the second branch the inquiries
would be (1) Is the Superintendent authorized under state law to proceed against
national banking associations? and (2) If so, is he precluded from doing so by virtue
of federal law? Again the district court went directly to the second question, which
it answered affirmatively. We believe the district court erred." 349 F.2d at 73-74.
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the Georgia branch banking statute, the court concluded that "the
law of Georgia, resting on its own bottom, would authorize the suit
by the Superintendent against a national bank for violation of
Georgia's branching laws."'40 The court noted that the Missouri case
permitted enforcement of state law where there is no conflict with
federal law,41 and was constrained to "disagree with the district courts
below and in the South .Dakota case that the passage of § 36 (c)
42
has stripped the [Missouri] ... case of its potency.P
In asserting that Missouri is still intact even after the passage of
section 36 (c), the Jackson court ignored the fact that in Missouri the
40 The assertion that the applicable state statute, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 13-201, -208
(Supp. 1966), authorizes the state banking superintendent to proceed against a national
bank is a questionable construction of Georgia law. The court reasoned as follows:
"Although Ga. Code § 13-201 expressly excludes national banking associations from
the definition of the term 'bank' as used in that Chapter, 'unless the context
otherwise indicates,' that section specifically states that 'national banking associations
shall have the same, but no greater, rights under or by virtue of this Title arid Acts
amendatory and supplementary thereof, than is granted to banks and trust companies
organized under the laws of this state.'" 349 F.2d at 74. Apparently the court construed § 13-201 to mean that national banking associations are to have no greater rights
than state banks and trust companies under any circumstances. However, if the
words "under or by virtue of this Title and Acts amendatory and supplementary
thereof" are given meaning, an alternative reading would be that national banks are to
have no greater rights than state banks under the particular Georgia statute. In the
instant case the national bank was not asserting rights under the Georgia statute, but
rather rights from the authority granted it by the Comptroller of the Currency to
establish a branch bank. As to whether state branching statutes apply to national
banks as a general matter, the Michigan court in Attorney General ex rel. State
Banking Comm'r v. National Bank has stated that because of the enactment of § 36 (c),
the Michigan branching statute would be invalid to the extent that it purported to
apply to national banks. 338 Mich. at 615, 61 N.W.2d at 807.
In addition to the disputable statutory construction, Jackson ignored the Georgia
Supreme Court's declaration that the state banking statute "was obviously intended to
apply only to the State Banks . . . ." Goodwin v. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank, 209 Ga.
908, 910, 76 S.E.2d 620, 622 (1953).
Furthermore, if the question adjudicated by the court was one of state law, the
opinion fails to reveal the theory upon which jurisdiction over the subject matter was
founded, since the case was before the court because it raised a federal question.
See note 23 supra. This point apparently influenced the South Dakota court. See
note 19 supra. Undoubtedly the court could have resolved this jurisdictional problem
by asserting ancillary jurisdiction over the non-federal question, even after omitting
to decide the federal question, Silver v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 191
(1901), since the same cause of action was alleged alternatively under federal and state
law, Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1933). The court was alerted by the
appellee's brief to the problem of enforcing the state claim alone while the case was
before it under federal question removal jurisdiction. Brief for Appellee, pp. 3-4, Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 349 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1965). Its silence on the issue may indicate
that the court was primarily concerned with the application of the federal, rather than
'the state, statute. See text accompanying notes 67-68 infra.
" 349 F.2d at 74. See text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
2 349 F.2d at 74.
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suit to enforce state law was permitted only after a threshold conclusion that the defendant national bank was not acting under color
of explicit federal authority. 43 It would therefore appear that the
Missouri doctrine is limited to enforcement of state law in the absence of federal authority and inapplicable to circumstances obtaining after the passage of section 36 (c). Thus, Missouri would be inapposite to sustain-or, for that matter, to prohibit-a suit by the state
when there is a federal statute in the field, even though that statute
incidentally incorporates state law.
However, the Missouri case is susceptible of alternative readings.
For example, it may be interpreted to stand for the proposition that
if the federal agency is acting pursuant to express federal authority,
state enforcement of its own branching law would create a conflict
ipso facto and thus would not be permitted.4 On the other hand,
the case may be read to imply that even if express federal authority
is present, a further inquiry is necessitated into whether conflict
actually arises from the exercise of the two powers. If it does not,
then the state could still enforce its law. The Jackson court adopted
the second alternative and reasoned that, since the substantive federal
terms incorporated those of the state law, there would be no conflict
with federal authority if the state enforced its own branching law
directly. 45 This conclusion, clothed in faultless logic, is beguilingly

persuasive. It obscures, however, the crucial issue of whether, despite
the identity of substantive provisions, this independent exercise of
state power may in fact hinder the full implementation of federal
policy, a contingency which the doctrine of pre-emption is designed
to obviate.46

The Jackson court also adopted a theory of implied congressional
"8"The national statutes are interrogated for the sole purpose of ascertaining
whether anything they contain constitutes an impediment to the enforcement of the
state statute, and the answer being in the negative, they may be laid aside as of no
further concern." 263 U.S. at 660.
" See ibid.: "It is insisted that the United States alone may inquire by quo warranto
whether a national bank is acting in excess of its charter powers, and that the State is
wholly without authority to do so. This contention will be conceded, since it is
plainly correct . .-"
The view that the passage of § 36 (c) automatically pre-empted state branching law
was apparently adopted by the court in South Dakota. 219 F. Supp. at 846.
" "Since, by virtue of § 36 (c), state law as to branching is federal law applicable
to national banking associations, we cannot see how the application of that [state]
law would in any way interfere with the operation of national banks or conflict with
federal authority." 349 F.2d at 74.
"1See notes 58-62 infra and accompanying text.
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authority to permit suit by a state which had been enunciated by the
Supreme Court in First Nat'l Bank v. Fellows ex rel. Union Trust
Co. 47

This case arose under a section of the Federal Reserve Act,4 8

similar in form to the current section 36 (c), 49 which authorized the

Federal Reserve Board to permit national banks to exercise trust and
other fiduciary powers where such activity was not in contravention of
state law. While the Supreme Court reversed the state court determination that this section of the Federal Reserve Act was unconstitutional,"0 the Court also denied the defendant national bank's contention that the state court lacked jurisdiction of the proceeding.51
Expressly by-passing the defendant's argument that state law had
been entirely pre-empted, 52 the Court held that the state's quo
warranto action was valid because the subject matter of the controversy, the exercise of trust powers, was closely related to a normal
state function.53 It thus implied from the terms of the statute congressional authority for the state court "to consider and pass upon the
17 244 U.S. 416 (1917). The state attorney general had brought an action in the
nature of quo warranto in the Michigan state court against the defendant national
bank, alleging, inter alia, violation of the state's laws governing the exercise of trust
powers by banks. The state court held that although no state law had been contravened, the federal statute authorizing national banks to perform trust functions was
invalid on the ground that Congress .had exceeded its constitutional powers. Attorney
General ex rel. Union Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 192 Mich. 640, 653-54, 159 N.W.
335, 339-40 (1916), rev'd, 244 U.S. 416 (1917).
,8 "The Federal Reserve Board shall be authorized and empowered:
(k) To grant by special permit to national banks applying therefor, when not in
contravention of State or local law, the right to act as trustee, executor, administrator,
or registrar of stocks and bonds under such rules and regulations as the said board
may prescribe." Federal Reserve Act, § 11, 38 Stat. 261 (1913) (now 12 U.S.C.
§ 92 (a) (1964)). (Emphasis added.)
49Both provisions sought to improve the competitive position of national banks
vis-h-vis state banks by extending to the former a power theretofore reserved to the
latter. In each instance the exercise of the power is conditioned upon receipt of
approval from a federal administrative authority, and the granting of this approval
is in turn conditioned upon the existence of state authority for competitor state banks
to engage in the same activity. But see text accompanying notes 58-62 infra for policy
differences between the two statutes.
50 244 U.S. at 423-24.
"1 1d. at 428.
5 Id. at 427.
" "[The] subject involves the action of state courts of probate in a universal sense,
[and implies] . . . from its very nature the duty of such courts to pass upon the
question [whether the particular activity was in contravention of state law] and the
power of the court below within the limits of state jurisdiction to settle so far as the
State was concerned the question for all such courts by one suit, thus avoiding the confusion which might arise in the entire system of state probate proceedings and the
very serious injury to many classes of society which also might be occasioned." Id.
at 428.
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question whether the particular power was or was not in contra,,54
The question of whether the Fellows rationale of implied congressional authority might be used as a ground for a state branching
suit brought pursuant to state law was considered in Attorney Gen5 There the
eral ex rel. State Banking Comm'r v. National Bank.u
Michigan court found that the trust powers situation was "clearly
distinguishable" from the branching issue because "the act of Congress [governing trust powers] provides for a course of action by a
Federal agency when and if it is not prohibited by State law, for in
such case it is the State law, while in the instant [branching] case it
is the act of Congress, which either permits or prohibits the action
in question."56 This distinction is specious, however, because under
the trust powers statute, just as under the branching law, it is federal
legislation which creates the authority that underlies the bank's
action. 57 Similarly, under both *statutes it is the federal administrative agency, not the bank, which is constrained to observe the
requirements of state law before the particular power is granted to
the national bank. In both instances the state statute effectively
applies to national banks by virtue of the incorporation of the state
standard into the federal legislation. Thus, there is no logical reason
vention of the state law ....

44 Ibid.
us338 Mich. 610, 61 N.W.2d 804 (1953). The question of implied congressional
authority was left open by the Missouri case. Although the majority indicated that its
decision would have been placed on pre-emption grounds if the bank's activity had
been specifically authorized by federal law, see note 43 supra and accompanying text,
the Court had no occasion to decide the result should the federal legislation incorporate
the state standard, as in § 36 (c). Ironically, the dissent, which argued that the state
lacked the capacity to question the exercise of federal authority as to bank branching,
263 U.S. at 668, recognized the Fellows doctrine, enunciated six years earlier, as a
possible exception to the general pre-emption rule: "[A]il the powers of a national
bank, like its right to exist at all, have their source in the laws of the United States.
Only where those laws bring state laws into the problem,--as by enabling national banks
to act as executors, administrators, etc., where that is permitted by state laws,-can
the latter have any bearing on the question of corporate power-the privileges which
the bank may exercise." Id. at 665-66 (Van Devanter, J., dissenting).
The South Dakota case ignored the possibility of using the Fellows implied congressional authority rationale.
58338 Mich. at 615, 61 N.W.2d at 807. (Emphasis added.)
37 The fact that the trust powers statute was the national bank's source of authority
was clearly shown by the Fellows court when it stated that the question was whether
the state attorney general could "resort in a state court to proceedings in the nature of
quo warranto to test the power of the corporation to exert the particular functions
given by the act of Congress.. . .1 244 U.S. at 427. (Emphasis added.) In fact, state
law is of no further importance once it is established that state banks are authorized to
exercise trust powers. See note 60 infra.
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why a court could not, following Fellows, find implied congressional
authority for a state to determine whether branching by a national
bank is violative of state law.
The ultimate issue in deciding a question of pre-emption is
whether the attempted exercise of state authority impinges upon,
or is compatible with, the implementation of federal legislation. 8
The Fellows result was founded on a consideration that is equally
applicable to branching, namely, the desirability of having state
courts decide questions of state law to prevent confusion when a
federal authority would otherwise have to render its own interpretation of the state's law.59 In the trust powers context, the pursuit of
this policy objective occasions negligible interference with the administration of the national banks. First of all, the question of
whether a state authorizes its banks to exercise particular trust powers
is a relatively uncomplicated one, unlikely to give rise to litigation. 0
Secondly, once decided, the issue will be settled for all banks for all
" Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Wham & Merril, Federal PreEmption: How to Protect the States' Jurisdiction, 43 A.B.A.J. 131, 134 (1957); Note,
12 STAN. L. REv. 208, 215 (1959). Whether the rubric is implied congressional

authority or pre-emption, a prerequisite to permitting state enforcement of state
law against a national bank would be the determination that the state would not be
subverting the purpose of the federal banking statute. Thus, if the considerations
which led the Fellows court to find implied congressional authority for state suit to
enforce trust provisions were present in the branching cases, Fellows might provide
authority for holding that state branch banking laws have not been pre-empted by
§ 36 (c).
11244 U.S. at 427-28. Disagreement over the construction of state law has frequently been the center of dispute in the branching cases. In addition to Jackson,
see, e.g., Union Say. Bank v. Saxon, 335 F.2d 718, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Community
Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224, 225 (6th Cir. 1962); Commercial State Bank v.
Gidney, 174 F. Supp. 770 (D.D.C. 1959).
"' The sole inquiry under the federal trust powers statute is whether state institutions which compete with national banks are authorized by the state to exercise trust
powers. If it was ever arguable that the federal statute operated to subject the
national banks to any additional or more specific state restrictions, an amendment
to the statute in 1918 made this position untenable. Act of Sept. 26, 1918, ch. 177,
§ 2 (k), 40 Stat. 968 (now 12 U.S.C. § 92 (b) (1964)); see Missouri ex rel. Burnes Nat'l
Bank v. Duncan, 265 .U.S. 17, 23-25 (1924). "Whatever may be the state law, national
banks having the permit of the Federal Reserve Board may act as executors if trust
companies competing with them have that power." Id. at 25.
Furthermore, since Fellows was decided as the first decision under the trust powers
statute, only four cases in which a state has been the complaining party have appeared
in the federal courts concerning this provision. Ex parte Worcester Nat'l Bank,
279 U.S. 347 (1929); Missouri ex rel. Burnes Nat'l Bank v. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17
(1924); Bates v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 101 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1939); Fidelity Nat. Bank
& Trust Co. v. Enright, 264 Fed. 236 (W.D. Mo. 1920). However, none of these cases
concerned whether the state had authorized its institutions to exercise trust powers.
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occasions so long as the state does not revoke the authority of its
own banks to exercise such powers. Thirdly, in the unlikely eventuality that a national bank should erroneously interpret and exercise
trust powers in contravention of state law, the burden of complying
with the law would be relatively slight when compared with the
nullification of the rather considerable investment in a branch bank.
On the other hand, a much greater threat to the administration of
the federal banks is posed by continued state enforcement of state
branching laws against national banks. Since section 36 (c) incorporates not only the basic state rule relating to the permissibility of
branching, but also the state's branch location limitations,,, the
potential questions raised by the branching statutes are numerous
and complex. Every authorization from the Comptroller of the
Currency to a national bank to establish a branch would bristle with
opportunities for the state to challenge the Comptroller's construc01 See, e.g., Hoosier State Bank v. Saxon, 248 F. Supp. 23, 236 (NJ. Ind. 1965);
Bank of Dearborn v. Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 394, 400 (ED. Mich. 1965). Although
§ 36(c)(2) (relating to branches outside the town of the principal bank) expressly incorporates state location requirements, § 36(c)( 1) (dealing with branches inside the
municipality of the parent bank) is silent on the point. See note I supra; 1965 DuKE L.J.
609, 612.
However, Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1965), aff'd
sub nor. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 492 (1966), has
dearly established that state requirements are equally applicable under § 36 (c) (1). In
Walker Utah law affirmatively authorized branching within the municipality in which
the main office was located but restricted such expansion to takeovers of established
banks which had been in operation for five years. UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-6 (Supp.
1965). Neither of the national banks in Walker complied with the restriction, and
certificates issued by the Comptroller were challenged by state banks. The Tenth Circuit held that the Comptroller must "look at all the State law on branch banking, not
just part of it." 352 F.2d at 94. The Supreme Court agreed, concluding that if the
Comptroller were permitted under § 36 (c) (1) to look only to state authorization provisions and to ignore the restrictions placed thereon, the well-defined congressional
policy of competitive equality would be frustrated. 87 Sup. Ct. at 497.
The Court also rejected the Comptroller's argument that § 86(c) incorporated only
state requirements relating to "whether" and "where" branches may be located and not
the "method" by which this may be done. "As to the restriction being a 'method,' we
have concluded that since it is part and parcel of Utah's policy, it was absorbed by the
provisions of § 36 (c) (1) and (2), regardless of the tag placed upon it." Ibid.
Despite the broad language employed by the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court
in Walker, it seems doubtful that the two courts intended to cast doubt on earlier cases
which have held that the approval of a state official is not a prerequisite to establishment
of a national bank branch, Rushton ex rel. Commissioner of Banking Dep't v. Michigan
Nat'l Bank, 298 Mich. 417, 299 N.W. 129 (1941), and that state "necessity" or "prospects
of successful operation" criteria are not applicable to national banks, American Bank
& Trust Co. v. Saxon, 248 F. Supp. 824, 880 (W.D. Mich. 1965).
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tion of state law and to decide it authoritatively in a different way. 62
Rather than the serene certainty arising from the definitive declaration on the exercise of trust powers, the result might be a disruptive
confusion in the establishment of branch banks. Bankers would
possibly be inhibited from proceeding under federal authority in the
face of a threat by the state to sue. The state would have, in effect, a
veto power over the decisions of the Comptroller, since it could conceivably contest every branching certificate. Thus, although logically
the Fellows doctrine would seem to support a state branching challenge, the great difference in the effect on the administration of the
national banks arising therefrom casts a serious doubt on the soundness of such a rule.
The chief failing of Jackson in its resolution of the pre-emption
question is its glib assumption that there could be no "conflict," in
the pre-emption sense, 63 arising from the continued enforcement of
state branching law, since that law is the adopted measuring rod of
the federal statute. As suggested above,6 there is a strong probability that such conflict would result, a contingency which should
have been taken into account before applying the Fellows and Missouri rationales to the branching situation. In order to obviate the
problems created by allowing an independent application of state
law, perhaps a preferable alternative solution would be to treat the
action as one questioning the defendant's federal authority to branch.
This course would raise the issue of the standing of the state to
challenge the Comptroller's determination of state law under section

36(c).

"'Litigation brought by competitor banks challenging the Comptroller's branching
certifications has increased in recent years since its inception in 1958. See note 10 supra
and accompanying text. A rule allowing states to sue to enforce their statutes directly
against national banks could greatly increase this volume of litigation, since the deterring effects of the standing requirement (see generally notes 65-109 infra and
accompanying text) and the expense of suing would nbt be present to discourage the
state.
08 Conflict for pre-emption purposes "does not depend upon the relatively objective
textual comparisons of state and federal statutes which a strictly repugnancy test involves. Rather it inquires more broadly into congressional purposes, and looks to see
if the state law gives promise of thwarting these objectives." Hunt, supra note 37, at
294. Cf. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941): "Our primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, Pennsylvania's law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and

objectives of Congress."
"' See notes 58-62 supra and accompanying text.
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II. Standing
Assuming that federal law has pre-empted an independent application of state branch banking provisions and suit is commenced
under federal law, or, alternatively, that a state official chooses in the
first instance to bring an action under section 36 (c), the threshold
issue is necessarily the standing of the state officer to sue under federal
law. The doctrine of standing, utilized to determine which parties
may sue, encompasses both constitutional requirements and considerations of judicial policy. 65 The only branch banking case which
has considered this issue explicitly is South Dakota, in which
standing was denied. 66 Possibly, however, the issue was decided in
Jackson. Despite the references which suggest that the court was
enforcing the state branch banking law,6 7 there are conflicting indications that the court actually decided a question of federal law raised
under section 36 (c).68 If in fact this is what the court intended, the
Or Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). The constitutional requirement
limits review to "cases" and "controversies." U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2; Massachusetts V.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923). The policy is based on judicial self-restraint.
Barrows v. Jackson, supra at 255. The principal underlying conception is that "the
party who invokes the [judicial] power must be able to show not only that the statute
is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as the result of its enforcement ...." Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra at
488. Although the court in Mellon is referring to standing to challenge legislation on
constitutional grounds, the considerations for standing to challenge administrative action
are similar. 3 DAvis,ADmin-ISrATrvE LAw TREATisE § 22.01, at 210-11 (1958) (hereinafter
cited as DAvis). See generally id. §§ 22.01-.18; Comment, 8 ST. Louis U.LJ. 83 (1963).
"0See note 21 supra and accompanying text. Texas v. National Bank of Commerce,
290 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1961), ignored the standing issue. See note 15 supra.
'TSee notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text.
8"[]f such facilities are not authorized to Georgia banks under Georgia law, then,
by virtue of § 36 (c), they are not authorized to national banks by the National Bank
Act." 249 F.2d at 73. The court said further: "The authority of the Superintendent to
bring an action such as that involved in this case was also implicit in our decision in
Texas ...." Id. at 75. (Emphasis added.) In Texas, the state was allowed to raise
a federal question, although its standing was not specifically considered. See note 15
supra. The clearest statement that federal law was enforced in Jackson appears in the
final footnote: "The fact that the Comptroller is charged under 12 U.S.C. § 93 with the
duty of enforcing the National Bank Act certainly does not have the effect of prohibiting actions to enforce that law by any other party who might have a legitimate
interest." 249 F.2d at 75 n.l. (Emphasis added.) Additionally, the dicta concerning
the plaintiff's standing, see notes 69-71 infra and accompanying text, indicate a question
of federal law, since the problem of standing would not exist if state law were being
enforced. Furthermore, it is clear that on remand the district court enforced the
federal statute. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 F. Supp. 134, 136-37 (M.D. Ga. 1965).
This is not conclusive as to the intention of the court of appeals, however, because
on remand the suit was consolidated with another action brought on the same cause
by a competitor bank, making the superintendent's standing moot. Id. at 136. Finally,
the case was removed to the federal courts under the federal question removal statute.
See note 23 supra.
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only grounds for the state superintendent's standing advanced by the
court are the assertions that he is "particularly well situated to represent interests adverse to those of a national bank,"6 9 that he is more
strongly motivated to see to it that national banks adhere to the substantive state standard than is the Comptroller," and, by implication, that he has a "legitimate interest' 'in maintaining the suit. 71
Traditionally, the test of standing has been whether some "legal
right" of the complaining party has been invaded, 72 a requirement
which has normally been determinable upon a demonstrated irreparable injury or the threat thereof.7 3 A state is ordinarily treated as a
private litigant for purposes of standing; however, some showing of
economic injury is generally required.7 4 Nevertheless, an allegation
of economic detriment to the state arising from the Comptroller's
excessively liberal construction of state branching statutes and the
consequent relative ease with which federal banks could branch is
probably too tenuous to be judicially cognizable. 75 As parens patriae,
the state may under some circumstances bring suit on behalf of its
60249
70

F.2d at 75.
1d. at 75 n.l.

"Ibid.

i

72See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-88 (1939).
13Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 810 U.S. 113, 125 (1940). Recent decisions have
allowed standing even when the alleged prpoerty injury was indirect, see Columbia
Broadcasting System v. United States, 816 U.S. 407, 422-23 (1942) (contractual relationships affected by administrative order); Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515,
519-21 (1929) (owner's business affected by grant of franchise to competitor) or future,
see United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1956) (planning of
future operations affected). However, such injury must be to a particular right of the
litigant, and vindication of the general public interest in the administration of the
law has been held insufficient to sustain standing of a private litigant. Perkins v.
Lukens Steel Co., supra.
7,See, e.g., cases cited note 75 infra. Compare City of Atlanta v. National Bituminous
Coal Comm'n, 308 U.S. 517, affirming 26 F. Supp. 606 (D.D.C. 1939) (city lacked standing to sue), with Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 320 U.S. 707 (1943) (injured consumer allowed to sue). Standing was denied
in South Dakota because no injury to the state's property rights had been shown.
See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
71Even if competitive inequality' caused a financial loss to state banks or encouraged them to migrate into the federal systim, this would not demonstrate an
economic injury to the state. The reason is that the state has no ownership interest
in state banks; it merely charters and regulates them.
Furthermore, the cases in which the state's standing has been grounded upon economic injury have been those where the Court could label the state a proprietor, e.g.,
Georgia v. Tennessee Cooper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 287 (1907) (owner of real property),
or where the injury was direct and tangible, e.g., Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n,
830 US. 127, 136-37 (1947) (loss of federal highway funds). But see Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 824 U.S. 439 (1945) (state "proprietary interest" as railroad owner treated
"merely as a 'makeweight' ").
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citizens,7 6 but it must show that the interest asserted is shared by its
citizens generally and that the suit is not simply for the benefit of
private parties.77 Yet the state's capacity to sue as parens patriae has
usually been limited to controversies involving private parties or
other states as defendants,78 and Massachusetts v. Mellon7 9 expressly
held that in relation to a federal taxing statute the federal government, not the state, stands as parens patriae8 0
No case has yet specifically articulated the interest which the state
is asserting in the branch banking situation that deserves judicial
protection."' Obviously, however, the state is intimately concerned
with the preservation of those instrumentalities which it has created.
This concern has been implicitly recognized by the statutorily created federal policy to maintain competitive equality between state
and national banks8 2 which is threatened by the likelihood that state
banks will convert into national institutions should expansion become easier in the federal system.83 Thus the significant question is
whether migration of state banks into the federal system, encouraged
by the Comptroller's misconstruction of the state branching statute,
is sufficient injury for the state to be given standing to challenge the
rulings of the Comptroller.
In Hopkins Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary,8 4 the Wisconsin State
Banking Commissioner sued to challenge a federal statute"9 which
76See, e.g., id. at 445; Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 142 (1902).
77 Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 396 (1938); Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 591-92 (1923); Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Louisiana State
Bd., 160 F. Supp. 387, 389 (E.D. La. 1958).
78 See, e.g., cases cited in notes 76-77 supra.
TO
262 U.S. 447 (1923).
,30Id. at 486. Thus, dearly the South Dakota court was correct when it suggested
that a showing of injury to its citizens would not be sufficient to give the state standing
to sue under § 36 (c). 219 F. Supp. at 847.
"1The plaintiff in South Dakota has come the closest to defining a state interest in
federal branch banking. See note 21 supra. A showing of sufficient interest is crucial,
because "if no comparable common-law right exists and no such constitutional or statutory interest has been created, relief is not available judicially." Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951) (concurring opinion).
"2See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
83A bank incorporated under state law may convert into a national banking association with the vote of shareholders owning fifty-one per cent of the stock and upon the
approval of the Comptroller of the Currency. Rxv. STAT. § 5154 (1875), as amended, 12
U.S.C. § 35 (1964). The number of state-to-federal conversions has increased significantly in the past decade. See Banking, Aug. 1965, p. 60.
"296 U.S. 315 (1935).
85Federal Home Loan Bank Act § 4 (a), 47 Stat. 726 (1932), as amended, 12 U.S.C.

§ 1424 (a) (1964).
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permitted state building and loan associations to convert into federal
savings and loan associations. In holding the statute unconstitutional to the extent that it permitted conversion when unauthorized
by state law,8 6 the Court founded the state's standing upon the encroachment on its reserved constitutional powers, "an invasion of
sovereignty or quasi-sovereignty" of the state,8 7 and upon its rela-

tion as parens patriae.88 The Court was careful to distinguish this
case from Massachusetts v. Mellon on the ground that in Hopkins

the alleged transgressor of state law was a corporation created by the
state rather than a federal instrumentality.8 9 This distinction was
the ground upon which South Dakota distinguished Hopkins.9 °

Yet this differentiation should not be pressed uncritically, for despite
the fact that the defendant association had been chartered by the

state, 91 the significant point is that Hopkins allowed a state, on the
basis of its interest in preserving its own institutions9 2 to challenge
a federal statute under the authority of which the defendant institu-

tion was defecting from the state system. It thus follows that upon
a showing of similar injury, a state could cite Hopkins as authority
80 296 U.S. at 335.
8

7Id. at 337. The Court found that the interest asserted by the state was a reserved
power under the tenth amendment to the Constitution. Subsequent to Hopkins, the
Court declared the tenth amendment to be "but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered," and that consequently "all means for the exercise of a
[federal] granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted
end" will be upheld as constitutional. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
However, this shift in constitutional emphasis does not necessarily affect the authority
of Hopkins on the standing issue. In the first instance, the Court in Hopkins expressly
disclaimed the notion that the decision was based upon -the scope of federal power.
296 U.S. at 343. Secondly, conceding that the state has no reserved power in the face
of a legitimate exercise of federal authority, nevertheless the continued recognition of
the state's constitutional interest for the purpose of standing is necessary to preserve
the opportunity for the legitimacy of the exercise of federal power to be raised for
in a judicial proceeding.
determination
8
Id. at 340.
88 "The ruling [in Massachusetts v. Mellon] was that it was no part of the duty or
power of a state to enforce the rights of its citizens in respect of their relations to the
Here, on the contrary, the state becomes a suitor to protect
Federal Government ....
the interests of its citizens against the unlawful acts of corporations created by the
state itself." Id. at 341.
90219 F. Supp. at 847-48.
01 However, when the suit was brought, the defendant had taken all the steps necessary under the statute to become a federal institution, 296 U.S. at 327, 331, and, as
such, was subject to federal authority.
92 State building and loan associations "have been given corporate capacity in the
belief that their creation will advance the common weal. The state, which brings them
into being, has aninterestin preserving their existence, for only thus can they attain the
ends of their creation." Id. at 336-37. (Emphasis added.)
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for its standing to challenge a determination by the Comptroller
under section 36 (c). Although this line of argument is made more
tenuous by the fact that the injury to the state results only indirectly
from the violation of the branch banking statute,93 the primary
policy consideration is the same in both instances, namely, that the
federal government ought to be prohibited from unlawfully enticing
state-chartered institutions into its own system.
Of possible assistance to the state banking supervisor is the Administrative Procedure Act,94 which provides for review of administrative action taken under statutes otherwise lacking review provisions. 95 By its terms the statute excludes review of "agency action
93A logical difficulty arises because in the conversion itself, which does injury to
the state interest, § 36 (c) is not violated, and conversely, the violation of § 36 (c) does
not itself injure a state interest unless it is related to the loss of a state bank to the
federal system through conversion. Actually, both elements were present in South
Dakota, where the violation alleged was the merger of the defendant national bank
with three state banks and the continued .operation of the latter as branches of the
parent contrary to the terms of the state branching statute. 219 F. Supp. at 844. However, the court found Hopkins to be distinguishable. See notes 89-90 supra and
accompanying text. For a clear instance in which branching privileges have been extended by the Comptroller where they would not have been by the state authority,
see discussion of Camden Trust Co. v. Gidney, 301 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1962), in Handler,
JurisdictionalAbstention in Federal-State Branch Bank Conflicts, 19 RUTGERs L. Rv.
445, 450-51 (1965). Such conflicts and the increase in conversions from state to federal
banks in recent years, note 83 supra, lend plausibility to the argument that the state
banking systems are being injured by the Comptroller's liberal branching policy. At
least one instance is reported in which the state authority denied a request for branching approval, whereupon conversion followed and the desired branch was authorized by
the Comptroller. See Banking, Aug. 1965, p. 62.
94"Except so far as (I) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by
law committed to agency discretion- (a) Right of review.
"Any person suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved, by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall
be entitled to judicial review thereof." Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
91See 3 DAvis § 22.04, at 221. As the Administrative Procedure Act represented a
compromise of widely divergent points of view, there has been some uncertainty as to
its effect on pre-existing law. See the summation of the legislative history and purpose
of the act in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 36-41 (1950), which suggests that
substantive changes in the law were effected. Id. at 40-41. In a very thorough article,
Professor Berger argues that a right to review is conferred by the act. Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUbf. L. Rxv. 55, 92 (1965).
Contra, 4 DAvis § 19.07, at 41-42; Jaffe, The Right to judicial Review, 71 HARV. L.
Rav. 769, 790-91 (1958) (the act merely codifies the existing presumption of reviewability). Apparently the Supreme Court agrees that the act has at least expanded the right to judicial review. Compare Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 232
(1953) (Court denied review but nevertheless expressed "a judicial attitude of hospitality towards the claim that § 10 greatly expanded the availability of judicial review"), with Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955) (under essentially the same
circumstances Court permitted review as a course "more in harmony with the generous review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act').
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[that] is by law committed to agency discretion." 96 On its face this
would seem to preclude review of the bank branching cases, as
branching certificates are by law granted within the discretion of the
Comptroller9 7 However, the APA has not been construed literally,
and it is clear that the presence of administrative discretion does not
foreclose review of action taken by the governmental agency, s a
proposition borne out by the branching cases themselves.9 9 Despite
the fact that a right of review is secured, however, the standing requirement must still be met.100 In this regard the act has probably
9a See note 94 supra.
"7See note 1 supra.
98See United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961) (no review of discretionary act unless the administrator exceeded his authority or acted wrongly);
Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (exceeding statutory powers does not constitute an exercise of administrative discretion); Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 33 (9th
Cir. 1958) ("The exercise of discretion by the agency does not in itself negative the
right to judicial review.')
Davis contends that regulation of national banks is confined exclusively to the
supervisory power of the regulatory agencies and is largely immune from judicial
review. 1 DAvis § 4.04, at 247-51. Nevertheless, this view has not prevailed in the
courts. In Community Nat'l Bank v. Gidney, 192 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Mich. 1961), aff'd
sub nom. Community Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224 (6th Cir. 1962), the district
court, citing DAvis, 192 F. Supp. at 518, ruled that the case fell within the "committed
to agency discretion" exception of the Administrative Procedure Act, thereby rendering
the Comptroller's decision unreviewable. Id. at 519. However, the court of appeals
discloses that in a later ruling, unreported and given orally, the district court held that
the Administrative Procedure Act did apply, but found that the Comptroller had not
abused his discretion. 310 F.2d at 225-26. The court of appeals affirmed without
specifically discussing whether the case fell within the statutory exception in view of
the Comptroller's discretion. Id. at 226-27.
In its initial holding, the district court had given as its primary reason for excepting
the Comptroller's decision from review the failure of Congress to set out within § 36 (c)
standards by which arbitrariness could be judged by the court. However, this fact
should not be controlling, because Congress has apparently never provided standards
of reasonableness or arbitrariness, and it is the function of courts to make this very
sort of determination. Berger, supra note 95, at 77-78. Davis argues that in the
banking area, "factors other than formal procedures or judicial review" are available
as a curb on the exercise of administrative power by the Comptroller, but he does not
specify what these various factors are. 1 DAvis § 4.04, at 251. Apparently in the
branch banking cases no extrajudicial remedy is available to an aggrieved party, for no
record has been found of any other form of recourse. It is felt that correction through
the political process is unpromising. Berger, supra note 95, at 80-81.
99 In addition to Community Natl Bank v. Gidney, supra note 98, see Bank of Dearborn v. Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Mich. 1965); First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l
Bank, 232 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 352 F.2d 267 (4th
Cir. 1965). Other cases have reviewed and overturned rulings of the Comptroller
without the use of the Administrative Procedure Act. Peoples Bank-Trenton v. Saxon,
244 F. Supp. 389, 394 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (Comptroller's reading of the state statute was
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion); Commercial Sec. Bank v. Saxon, 236
F. Supp. 457, 459 (D.D.C. 1964) (Comptroller has "no discretion to unlawfully issue
a certificate.')
100 See notes 94-95 supra. The language of § 10 of the APA indicates that the
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left the pre-existing law unchanged, 1' 0 although the argument has
been advanced that the statute has relaxed the standing limitation. 102
However, the act has not as yet been relied upon in a branch banking
case as a ground for standing.
Because the state's interest is basically public and regulatory as
opposed to private or proprietary, it may be difficult to establish a
rationale to support the standing of a state to seek the enforcement of
section 36 (c) under the traditional tests. 03 Unless the state can show
the invasion of an interest which merits judicial protection, as was
done in Hopkins,'" the congressional deference to state interests
represented by the incorporation of state law into section 36 (c) will
not alone provide standing, despite the fact that no other remedy is
available to restrain the Comptroller from indirectly violating state
law. 10 5 Thus, South Dakota was on secure legal footing in denying
traditional requirement of "legal wrong". continues to apply unless the detriment
alleged is protected by statute.
101Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 981-3 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955) (act adopted existing law on standing); Atchison T. & S.F.
Ry. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 76, 78 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892
(1955).
102 Davis contends that the statute provides review for anyone who is in fact adversely
affected by an administrative decision. 3 DAvis § 22.02. Berger argues that the statute
departs from prior law in that, while adverse personal effect and unlawful conduct
are still required, invasion of a "legal right" is not. Berger, supra note 95, at 85-88.
However, no cases have been found to support this view.
10
3The cases in which the courts have been most generous in relaxing the requirements for standing have been those in which a distinctly personal right was asserted,
e.g., Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955) (alien under deportation order); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255-59 (1953) (plaintiff permitted to assert constitutional
rights of a third party), or, when the right was less personal, those in which it could be
rationalized as proprietary, e.g., Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 32-33 (9th Cir. 1958)
(review
permitted on ground that plaintiff's mining claim was a property right).
10
1 See text accompanying note 92 supra.
10
5 H6wever, where injury has been established, the fact that no other remedy is
available may influence the decision to allow the plaintiff to sue. See, e.g., Commercial
State Bank v. Gidney, 174 F. Supp. 770, 778 (D.D.C. 1959), aff'd per curiam, 278 F.2d 871
(D.C. Cir. 1960); cf. Utah Fuel Co. v. National Bitmuminous Coal Comm'n, 306 U.S.
56, 60 (1939) (plaintiff allowed to sue partly because of lack of other remedy). Lack of
another remedy influenced the Hopkins court to find standing. See 296 U.S. at 339.
The state could argue that there is no other remedy available when there is no
competitor bank within the trading area which could bring the suit. In Jackson this
condition did not exist, because after the district court judgment a Georgia state bank
brought a separate suit on the same cause of action, which was consolidated with
Jackson upon its remand from the court of appeals, whereupon judgment was rendered
for the plaintiffs. Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Ga. 1965). On
the other hand, there was no state bank in the competitive area available to act as
plaintiff in the South Dakota case. Letter from Mr. Horace R. Hansen, amicus curiae
on behalf of the Independent Banker's Association of America to the Duke Law Journal,
Oct. 12, 1965.
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the state standing, and Jackson faltered when it suggested that adverse
interest bolstered by strong motivation was sufficient to allow the
state to sue. 10 8 However, it may well be that traditional concepts,
literally and mechanically applied, are inadequate to meet the challenge of misinterpretation of state law by federal authorities to the
detriment of state institutions. Thus, in the future there may be
a greater tendency to find a sufficient state interest by courts which
have grown apprehensive about the sometimes insensitive application of state law by the Comptroller,1 0 7 whose self-avowed policy of
expansi6 n has deliberately conflicted with the more conservative
policies of many of the states.' 08 When the court feels that the Comptroller is flouting the law, it may be less inclined to let the flexible
doctrine of standing-which has been conveniently ignored in the
service of judicial expediency' 09-stand in the way of relief.
10
6See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra. There is no question but that the
state's interest is adverse. However, the decisive question was not confronted in
Jackson, namely, whether a state interest had been injured with sufficient directness

and severity so as to warrant judicial intervention.
107The South Dakota court was sympathetic to the state's grievance and regretted
that it could not "change the law to fit the needs of the occasion." 219 F. Supp. at 854.
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the question of suits brought by states under
§ 36 (c), but it has ruled against the Comptroller in suits brought by competitor banks.

First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 87 Sup. Ct. 492 (1966). Furthermore, it
has had occasion to express its disapproval of the manner in which the Comptroller
has pursued his policies. In Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New. Orleans & Trust Co.,
232-F.2d 290 (D.C. Cir. 1963), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 379 U.S. 411
(1965), the branching question was raised, but the Court disposed of the case on
another ground. However, the Court specifically reserved the question of review of
the Comptroller's decisions. 379 U.S. at 423. In dissent, M~r. Justice Douglas expressly
approved lower court review of the Comptroller: "This rule keeps the Comptroller
from being a free-wheeling agency dispensing federal favors; and it gives some
assurance that he will render principled decisions within the rule of law laid down
by Congress." Id at 428. Observing that "the Comptroller candidly states that the
new branch bank would be in business, flouting the new Louisiana law," Douglas
asserted that under the ruling of the majority "the Comptroller can take the law into
his own hands without restraint from anyone." Id. at 429-30.
10
6 See notes 10-11 supra and accompanying text. One of Comptroller Saxon's objectives was to bring about substantive changes in state banking statutes which he considered outmoded, and the controversies he instigated were not inadvertent. Bratter,
Fresh Air in the Comptroller's Office, Banking, July 1962, p. 45. Saxon has stated:
"Admittedly we are putting on the pressure all over the country. It is no accident;
it is deliberate and calculated. We hope the states will pick up the ball ...." Id. at
130.
'09See, e.g., Texas v. National Bank, 290 F.2d 229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
832 (1961) (state's standing to sue not mentioned by the court).
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III. Conclusion
The branch banking conflict raises a difficult problem in federalism. Congress, having attempted to equalize the two competing
forces within the dual banking system, established only the broad
outline when it bound the Comptroller to observe state law. No
check was provided to ensure the Comptroller's compliance with the

standards set by the states in the event of conflict in the gray area of
differing but plausible constructions of state law, nor was a remedy
supplied to correct an arbitrary decision or abuse of discretion by
the Comptroller. 110 The states are now seeking to use section
36 (c), the instrument created to narrow the competitive advantage
of state over national banks, for the purpose of restraining the federal
instrumentalities from becoming the favored group. Since Congress
has given statutory recognition to the interest of the state, the
issue becomes when, if at all, the state's interest rises to such importance that the state itself will be enabled to challenge the decision of the Comptroller."' Hopkins indicates that the protection
of the judiciary may be invoked at some ill-defined point when the
impairment of state institutions becomes objectionable." 2 It is
-10 However, note that in some recent cases, brought by private litigants, courts have
granted relief upon a finding that the Comptroller had acted beyond his discretion.
See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
I'l It is submitted that the sounder theory for an action by the state is standing to
sue under the federal statute, rather than state enforcement of its own branching
statute.

See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLU.

L. REv.

489, 529 (1954). Handler, himself a state official, concurs in this view. Handler, supra
note 93, at 466. Under the former theory any right asserted by the state would derive
from the incorporation of state law within § 86 (c), and not from the failure of the federal government to pre-empt the field of branching by national banks. Accordingly, any
litigation would occur in the federal courts, a procedure which does not allow the
state to decide an issue of state law in its own forum. Nevertheless, this undesirable
factor would be offset by a reduction in potential state interference with the regulation
of the federal banking system, a result which can be assured by imposing a high burden
of proof on the state to demonstrate abuse of discretion by the Comptroller. See note
113 infra.

"'Perhaps it can be argued that Fellows, as authority for the proposition that a
state might have implied congressional authority to decide questions of state law that
are adopted by reference in federal legislation, is somewhat qualified by the circumstances in which it arose. After all, the primary question at issue there was the constitutionality of the federal statute, and the ruling on the state's ability to bring the
suit was merely a necessary step along the way. Similarly, the Hopkins rule is
attenuated when it is applied in the branching situation, see note 93 supra and
accompanying text. However, if the Court will protect the state's interest in its
chartered financial institutions from encroachment by the over-extension of congressional power, see note 92 supra and accompanying text, then it follows that this
same interest may be shielded from infringement by arbitrary administrative power.
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submitted that the line be drawn and the state be allowed to sue
where the court finds that the Comptroller's deviation from the
state standard is sufficiently substantial 13 and the harm to the state,
actual or potential, 1 4 is sufficiently grave as to outweigh the effect
of potential interference with the administration of the federal
banks."65 Obviously, each such determination must be made on the
particular facts presented, and the doctrine of standing is well suited
for the requisite judicial weighing and balancing.
It could be argued, however, that because the courts have allowed
competitor banks to sue, there is sufficient restraint on the Comptroller and that to extend standing to the states would be a superfluous, perhaps harmful, act which would give rise to potential state
interference with the operation of national banks. Yet this argument cuts both ways. If the courts are willing to curb the Comptroller when a competitor bank sues, how are they to justify giving
him a free hand to defy the state statutory standards when a competitor bank does not happen to be within the trading area of a
proposed national bank branch? The anomaly of the latter course is
that whether the Comptroller may be restrained from acting arbitrarily turns upon the sheer fortuity that there is a properly located
competitor bank which is willing, both from a financial and a public
relations point of view, to bring suit.
Both cases exemplify the court's agility in applying traditional doctrines so as to reach
the desired result.
11S The standard of review of the Comptroller's ruling would properly be the same
administrative standard that is now applied when the plaintiff is a competitor bank. See,
e.g., Community Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224, 225-26 (6th Cir. 1962) (arbitrary,
capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law); Bank of
Dearborn v. Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 394, 403 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (abuse of discretion);
Peoples Bank-Trenton v. Saxon, 244 F. Supp. 389, 394 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (arbitrary,
capricious, and abuse of discretion).
This standard of review should be sufficiently high to deter frivolous suits. The
Comptroller's reading of state law is withi-n his own discretion, of course, and thus is
subject to change from one individual Comptroller to another. Former Comptroller
Saxon, who was very aggressive in seeking bank expansion, intentionally put a strain on
state limitations which he considered unduly restrictive, see note 108 supra, and
conflict was high during his tenure. N.Y. Times, March 21, 1966, p. 49, col. 8.
I' If the injury is of the sort that will be judicially recognized once it has occurred,
a mere threat of such injury should be sufficient to invoke the equitable powers of
the court. No constructive purpose would be served, for example, by waiting for a
large defection of state banks to occur before allowing the state to challenge the
Comptroller's violations of the statute.
11r In addition, to ensure that the state is not suing merely on behalf of private
interests, a showing that there are no available competitor banks which could otherwise
be plaintiffs might prudently be taken into account.
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Underlying the present legal conflict are fundamental questions
of banking policy, which are beyond the scope and competence of the
judicial power. As former Comptroller Saxon has maintained, it
may be that legislation enacted during the Depression is no longer
suited to contemporary needs and that those who resist reform are
The issues of banking policy,
serving vested interests of their own.21'
however, have heavy political overtones, and thus any change is
more properly left to the legislature. Nevertheless, once a legislative
criterion is established, the judiciary must not remain inactive, or
Congress' designs may be thwarted. In fact, under present conditions
the congressional policy of competitive equality is in danger of being
undermined if judicial recognition is not given to the states' interest
in the branching decisions of the Comptroller.
26 See Banking, May 1963, p. 157.

